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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a novel constant-size threshold attribute-based signcryption scheme for securely
sharing data through public clouds. Our proposal has several advantages. First, it provides flexible crypto-
graphic access control, while preserving users’ privacy as the identifying information for satisfying the access
control policy are not revealed. Second, the proposed scheme guarantees both data origin authentication and
anonymity thanks to the novel use of attribute based signcryption mechanism, while ensuring the unlinkability
between the different access sessions. Third, the proposed signcryption scheme has efficient computation cost
and constant communication overhead whatever the number of involved attributes. Finally, our scheme sat-
isfies strong security properties in the random oracle model, namely Indistinguishability against the Adaptive
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA2), Existential Unforgeability against Chosen Message Attacks (EUF-
CMA) and privacy preservation of the attributes involved in the signcryption process, based on the assumption
that the augmented Multi-Sequence of Exponents Decisional Diffie-Hellman (aMSE-DDH) problem and the
Computational Diffie Hellman Assumption (CDH) are hard.
1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, technological advances relieve an im-
portant growth of digital contents which rises the de-
mand for new storage and network capacities and in-
creases the need for more cost-effective use of stor-
age and network bandwidth for data transfer. Thus,
cloud storage systems are gaining an expanding inter-
est thanks to their profitable architecture which sup-
ports transmission, storage in a multi-tenant environ-
ment, and intensive computation of outsourced data in
a pay per use business model. However, cloud bene-
fits are spoiled with significant and persistent security
concerns that come primarily from the loss of data
control (Carlin et al., 2015). That is, users are called
to store their sensitive information on remote servers.
These security concerns lead us to the necessity of
designing comprehensive access control mechanism
for outsourced data while ensuring data confidential-
ity, data authenticity and protecting users’ privacy.
Traditional cryptosystems were designed to confiden-
tially encrypt data to a target recipient, however, in a
cloud environment, this may restrict the range of op-
portunities and flexibility offered by cloud systems.
Hence, several access control mechanisms were intro-
duced to ensure data security in outsourced systems
(Bacis et al., 2016; di Vimercati et al., 2016; di Vimer-
cati et al., 2014; Kaaniche et al., 2014; Belguith et al.,
2016; Belguith et al., 2015).
Signcryption, first introduced by Zheng (Zheng,
1997), is an important cryptographic primitive to en-
sure data confidentiality and authenticity. Signcryp-
tion is a logical combination of encryption, providing
confidentiality, and signature, supporting data authen-
ticity and integrity, in a single primitive. This novel
concept offers a reduced cost, in terms of compu-
tation and communication complexity, compared to
the cumulative cost of encryption and signature. At-
tribute Based Signcryption (ABSC) which combines
the functions of Attribute Based Encryption (ABE)
(Bethencourt et al., 2007) and Attribute Based Signa-
ture (ABS) (Maji et al., 2011) is appropriate to en-
sure fine-grained data access control in large-scale
distributed environments mainly cloud storage envi-
ronments. Cloud users are able to outsource their
data to cloud servers and achieve efficient data shar-
ing with other users. In this scenario, ensuring con-
fidentiality of outsourced data in remote servers may
not be enough considering that cloud clients should
also be able to anonymously authenticate with the
cloud server, in order to avoid unauthorized storage
and modification of data, while preserving their pri-
vacy.
In this paper, we propose a novel constant-size at-
tribute based signcryption scheme that ensures flex-
ible access control and anonymous data access to out-
sourced data, with respect to a threshold access pol-
icy. Our proposed mechanism has several advan-
tages. First, the proposed scheme ensures flexible ac-
cess control to data which preserves the users’ pri-
vacy while authenticating with the remote server. In
addition, it provides anonymous data origin authen-
tication in order to ensure that outsourced data are
uploaded and modified by an authorised user. Sec-
ond, the size of the signcrypted message does not de-
pend on the number of attributes involved in the ac-
cess policy, which makes our scheme more suitable
for bandwidth-limited applications. Contrary to most-
existing schemes, the size of ciphertext/signature is
linear to the number of signing and encrypting at-
tributes used in the signcryption process. Thus, our
proposal is highly scalable and offers interesting per-
formances, at both the client and the cloud provider
sides. Third, our scheme satisfies strong security
properties in the random oracle model, namely Indis-
tinguishability against the Adaptive Chosen Cipher-
text Attacks (IND-CCA2), Existential Unforgeabil-
ity against Chosen Message Attacks (EUF-CMA) and
privacy preservation of the attributes involved in the
signcryption process.
Paper Organisation – The remainder of this work
is as follows: Section 2 highlights security consid-
erations and design goals. Then, Section 3 reviews
related work and introduces attribute based signcryp-
tion mechanisms. In Section 4, we describe the sys-
tem model, as well as the security model. Afterwards,
we detail the framework design and present our con-
crete construction in Section 5. Section 6 presents
a rigorous security discussion. Finally, a theoretical
analysis of computational performances is presented
in Section 7, before concluding in Section 8.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
As cloud computing is achieving increased pop-
ularity, several organisations are using the cloud ar-
chitecture in a collaborative way, for their employ-
ees and/or collaborators to share and collaboratively
update a document in progress. In case of a multi-
national company having different sites all over the
world, employees and collaborators can be orga-
nized into different dynamic working groups where
each member of the working group can access doc-
uments, modify their contents and propose sugges-
tions. Hence, users access rights have to be speci-
fied, for defining which users can access which data
item(s).
Beyond the need for a flexible access control to
data, it is necessary to provide data origin authentica-
tion as documents have to be checked as coming from
a reliable source. The idea is to counteract illegal
data storage by permitting only the authorized users
to upload or update the data files. As such, mem-
bers of the working group have to be able to check
that the document originates from one of the mem-
bers. Also, privacy preservation of the members is
of importance, especially in the following scenario.
A Human Resources (HR) department wants to pub-
lish a survey about the employees satisfaction of the
company’s strategy. The HR manager then uploads a
file on the cloud storage platform and shares the file
with the employees. For the employees to feel free to
post opinions and suggestions on the document, there
is a high interest in that case to support anonymity
of the members, to avoid the members, the HR man-
ager or the cloud provider to identify the origin of a
comment. Finally, as documents are outsourced to
a cloud storage service, and the cloud provider can
not be fully trusted, it is of high importance to sup-
port data confidentiality against curious storage cloud
providers. This collaborative scenario can be used
in different fields, namely, industrial sectors (such as
multinational companies), medical organisations (e.g.
medical research groups), social networks· · · .
To support all these features with efficiency, we
propose to design a threshold attribute-based sign-
cryption (t-ABSC) to be run at the client side. Indeed,
in collaborative use cases, threshold access structures
are much more appropriate than monotone access
policies. Indeed, they are much more malleable, such
that, an authorized user has to only satisfy t attributes
from n . The idea is first to use the attribute-based
concept to support the flexible sharing of outsourced
data among a dynamic group of users, and second to
benefit from the efficiency of the signcryption concept
as the data secrecy and authenticity mechanisms are
partly merged, contrary to the heavier traditional way
considering separate signature and encryption opera-
tions.
Thus, the design of solution is motivated by pro-
viding the support of both robustness and efficiency
while fulfilling the following properties:
• data confidentiality – our t-ABSC scheme has to
protect the secrecy of outsourced and encrypted
data contents against curious users.
• flexible access control – our proposal should en-
sure flexible security policies among dynamic
groups of users.
• data origin authenticity – the proposed scheme
has to guarantee the data origin anonymous au-
thentication property, while ensuring the unlinka-
bility between the different access sessions.
• privacy – our solution must protect group mem-
bers’ access patterns privacy, while creating, up-
loading and requesting access to outsourced data.
That is, the cloud server must be able to grant ac-
cess with no need to additional identifying infor-
mation of the requesting users.
• low computation overhead and storage cost – the
proposed algorithms should also have low pro-
cessing complexity and acceptable storage cost, at
both cloud provider side and client side.
3 ATTRIBUTE BASED
SIGNCRYPTION SCHEMES
In 1997, Zheng et al. (Zheng, 1997) proposed
the signcryption concept as a primitive that combines
the functions of digital signature and encryption in a
single logical step. Afterwards, several signcryption
schemes have been proposed either in public key in-
frastructure or for Identity Based Encryption settings
(Libert and Quisquater, 2004; Dent et al., 2010).
Haber et al. (Haber and Pinkas, 2001) have first
proposed the idea of combining a public encryption
scheme and a signature scheme to have the common
public parameters and the key. However, in this con-
cept, the Encrypt and Decrypt (resp. Sign and Ver-
ify) of the encryption (resp. signature) schemes were
kept unchanged. Later, Vasco et al. (Vasco et al.,
2008) proposed a combination of the Identity based
Scheme and the Identity based Signature in a joint se-
curity model. In 2010, Gagne´ et al. proposed At-
tribute based SignCryption (ABSC) with a threshold
structure (Gagne et al., 2010). In fact, this ABSC
scheme is efficient compared with the encrypt-then-
sign paradigm. As in CP-ABE, an encrypting entity
can specify the access structure for decrypting enti-
ties, and as in ABS, each decryption entity can ver-
ify the encrypting entity’s attributes. Note that the
Gagne´ et al. definition does not consider the signer’s
attribute privacy. This permits the decryption entity
to verify the encryption entity’s attribute explicitly.
However, this scheme is based on the use of two dif-
ferent sets of signing attributes and sets of decryp-
tion attributes as well as using two access structures
related to signature and encryption. As such, the
size of the generated signcrypted message increases
linearly with the number of attributes, associated to
the signing and encryption policies In (Emura et al.,
2012), Keita et al. proposed an ABSC scheme with
dynamic property, where the access structures of en-
crypting entity can be changed without reissuing se-
cret keys of users. This signcryption scheme gener-
ates a signcrypted message whose size increases lin-
early with the number of attributes used in the access
structures. Recently, Liu et al. (Liu et al., 2015) intro-
duced an attribute based signcryption inspired from
the ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption in-
troduced by Waters (Waters, 2011) and the attribute
based signature proposed by Maji et al. (Maji et al.,
2011). Their proposal is used to secure personal
health records in cloud storage. This scheme is based
on the use of two different sets of signing attributes
and sets of decryption attributes as well as using two
access structures related to signature and encryption.
As such, the size of the generated signcrypted mes-
sage increases linearly with the number of attributes,
associated to the signing and encryption policies.
The communication and computation overhead as
well as the bandwidth consumption in the existing ci-
phertext policy attribute based signcryption (Gagne
et al., 2010; Emura et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015)
schemes increase linearly with the number of at-
tributes required in the access policies. In 2014, Rao
et al. (Rao and Dutta, 2014) proposed the first key-
policy attribute based signcryption scheme with con-
stant ciphertext size (Rao and Dutta, 2016). How-
ever, in the key-policy attribute based schemes, the
data owners cannot decide on who has access to their
encrypted data, except by their choice of descriptive
attributes for the data, since the access policy is em-
bedded in the user private keys. As a result, the data
owners have to trust the key issuer. Ciphertext-policy
attribute based schemes remove such inconvenience
by directly embedding the access policy on the cipher-
text. Thus, Ciphertext-policy attribute based schemes
are much more appropriate to data outsourcing. This
motivates us to address the problem of constructing a
ciphertext policy attribute based signcryption scheme
which introduces a signcrypted message with a con-
stant size and constant computation cost for flexible
access control, data confidentiality and anonymous
data origin authenticity.
Table 1 details the computation and storage costs
of different attribute based signcryption schemes. We
denote by ns = |As| and ne = |Ae| where As and Ae
present the set of attributes of the user obtained from
the key extraction procedure, for signing and encrypt-
ing respectively. For common setup process, we de-
note by n = |A| the cardinal of the set of user’s at-
tributes. Let ls and le denote the size of the signing
policy and the encryption policy, respectively. Let t,
O(M) and m respectively define the threshold value,
the size of the plaintext message M and the cardinal
of the attributes’ universe U.
4 MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we first present the system model
of our constant-size (t,S)-attribute based signcryption
scheme. Then, we detail our security model.
4.1 System Model
We suppose that the signcrypting entity chooses a
subset S from the universe of attributes U and a
threshold t such that 1≤ t ≤ |S| to define his (t,S) ac-
cess policy. Then, he signcrypts the message M ∈M
(i.e; M is the message space) with respect to the pol-
icy (t,S).
Our constant-size threshold attribute based signcryp-
tion consists of four randomized algorithms: Setup,
KeyGen, SignCrypt and UnsignCrypt, defined as
follows:
Setup(ξ) → (PP,msk) – the setup algorithm is
performed by the central trusted authority. It takes
as input a security parameter ξ. The Setup algorithm
outputs the public parameters PP and the secret master
key msk.
KeyGen(PP,msk,Ei,Ai)→ skEi – this randomized
algorithm is executed to derive the secret keys of the
user Ei. Given the public parameters PP, an attribute
set Ai ⊂ U (i.e; U is the attribute universe) of the
user Ei and the secret master key msk. The algorithm
outputs the user’s secret key skEi associated to the at-
tribute set Ai.
SignCrypt(PP,skES ,AS,(t,S),M)→Σ – the sign-
cryption algorithm is performed by a signcrypting en-
tity ES. It takes as inputs the public parameters PP,
the user secret key skES , the set of signing attributes
AS, the (t,S) threshold access policy and the message
M. This algorithm outputs the signcrypted message
M referred to as Σ.
UnsignCrypt(PP,skEU ,AU ,(t,S),Σ) → M – the
unsigncryption algorithm is executed by the user EU .
It takes as inputs the public parameters PP, the set of
attributes AU of EU , the signcrypted message Σ, the
access policy (t,S) and the user’s private key skEU .
The algorithm returns the message M if the user EU
has successfully verified the signature output by ES
and has obtained the secret key related to the t re-
quired attributes for deciphering the signcrypted mes-
sage. Otherwise, the algorithm outputs a reject sym-
bol ⊥.
Our constant-size (t,S)-attribute based signcryp-
tion scheme has to satisfy the correctness property.
The correctness property requires that for all secu-
rity parameter ξ, all universe descriptions U, all
(PP,msk) ∈ Setup(ξ), all Ai ⊆ U, all domain enti-
ties Ei, all
skEi ∈ KeyGen(PP,msk,Ei,Ai), all M ∈M , all (t,S)∈
G (G is the access policy space) and all Σ ∈
SignCrypt(PP,skES ,AS,
(t,S),M) (i.e; ES is the signcrypting entity), if the
unsigncrypting user EU has successfully verified the
signature output by ES and obtained the secret key
related to the t required attributes for deciphering
the signcrypted message such that |AS ∩ S| ≥ t and
|AU ∩S| ≥ t, the UnsignCrypt(PP,skEU ,AU ,(t,S),Σ)
outputs M.
4.2 Security Model
In this section, we consider two threat models for
proving security and privacy properties of our pro-
posed constant-size (t,S)-attribute based signcryption
scheme. We first consider the case of a honest but cu-
rious cloud provider. That is, the cloud server is hon-
est as it provides proper inputs or outputs, at each step
of the protocol, properly performing any calculations
expected from it, but it is curious in the sense that it
attempts to gain extra information from the protocol.
As such, we consider the honest but curious threat
model against the confidentiality and privacy require-
ments with respect to adaptive chosen-ciphertext at-
tacks (IND-CCA2) and the computational privacy of
involved attributes.
Second, we consider the case of malicious users try-
ing to override their rights. That is, malicious users
may attempt to deviate from the protocol or to provide
invalid inputs. As such, we consider the malicious
user security model mainly against the unforgeabil-
ity requirement considering chosen message attacks
(CMA).
Table 1: Features and Functionality Comparison of Attribute Based Signcryption Schemes
Scheme Common Setup Type Access Policy Key size Signcryption size
(Emura et al., 2012) No CP-ABE Monotone 2ns,2ne+1+m O(le)+O(ns)
(Liu et al., 2015) No CP-ABE Monotone ns+2,ne+2 O(ls)+O(le)
(Gagne et al., 2010) No CP-ABE Threshold 3ne,2ns O(M)+O(ne)+O(ns)
(Rao and Dutta, 2014) No KP-ABE Monotone m+ ls,m+ le O(1)
Our scheme Yes CP-ABE Threshold n+m+1 O(1)
4.2.1 Confidentiality
A threshold attribute based signcryption t-ABSC
scheme is said to be indistinguishable against
non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks if there is
no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary
that can win the Expcon f security game with non-
negligible advantage. The Expcon f security game
is formally defined, between an adversary A and a
challenger C as follows:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A se-
lects a set of signcryption attributes S∗ (i.e; S∗ corre-
sponds to the set of attributes specified for the access
policy) to be used to signcrypt the challenge cipher-
text, and sends S∗ to the challenger C .
Setup – the challenger C runs the Setup(ξ) algo-
rithm of the signcryption scheme and sends the public
parameters PP to the adversary A .
Unsigncryption Query Phase 1 – the adversary
A can request, as many times as he wants, the follow-
ing queries:
• KeyGen – the adversary A queries, for each
session i, a signcryption attribute set AA ,i with
respect to a threshold ti where |AA ,i ∩ S∗| <
ti. The challenger C answers by running the
KeyGen(PP,msk,A ,AA ,i) algorithm and sends the
resulting secret key to the adversary A . The secret
key is referred to as skA ,i.
• UnsignCrypt – the adversary A requests the
unisgncryption of Σ with respect to a threshold
ti, while considering the signcryption attribute
set AA ,i. The challenger C executes the KeyGen
algorithm to generate the secret key skC ,i =
KeyGen(PP,msk,C ,AC ,i), such that |AC ,i ∩ S∗| ≥
ti. Finally, the challenger C answers the query by
running the UnsignCrypt(PP,skC ,i,AC ,i,
(ti,S∗),Σ) algorithm that outputs a message m or
a reject symbol ⊥.
Challenge Phase – during the challenge phase,
the adversary picks two equal length plaintexts M0∗
and M1∗ and a threshold signcrypting attribute set
(t∗,S∗) (i.e; t∗ has never been queried during the Un-
signcryption Query Phase 1) and sends them to the
challenger. The challenger C chooses a random bit b
from {0,1}, extracts a signcrypting secret key skC =
KeyGen(PP,msk,AC ) and computes the challenge
signcrypted message Σb∗ = SignCrypt(PP,skC ,AC ,
(t∗,S∗),Mb∗). Then, the challenger sends Σb∗ to the
adversary.
KeyGen Query Phase 2 – in this phase,
the adversary A who has already received Σb∗,
can query a polynomially bounded number of
queries as in Unsigncryption Query Phase 1,
except that the adversary A can not make an
UnsignCrypt(PP, ,skA ,i,AA ,i,(ti,S∗),Σb∗) such that
|AA ,i∩S∗|= t∗, where ti < t∗.
Guess – the adversary tries to guess which mes-
sage Mi, where i ∈ {0,1} corresponds to the enci-
phered data Σb∗. Thus, A outputs a bit b′ of b
and wins the game if b = b′. The advantage of
the adversary A in the above game is defined as
AdvA [ExpCon f (1ξ)] = |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |.
Definition 1. A t-ABSC scheme satisfies the IND-
CCA2 confidentiality property, if the probability
AdvA [Expun f (1ξ)] is negligible for any PPT adver-
saries.
4.2.2 Unforgeability
A threshold attribute based signcryption t-ABSC
scheme is unforgeable against chosen message attack
(EUF-CMA) if there is no probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) adversary that can win the Expun f secu-
rity game with non-negligible advantage. The Expun f
security game is formally defined, between an adver-
sary A and a challenger C as follows:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A se-
lects a set of signcryption attributes S∗ (i.e; S∗ corre-
sponds to the set of attributes specified for the access
policy) to be used to signcrypt the challenge cipher-
text, and sends S∗ to the challenger C .
Setup – the challenger C runs the Setup(ξ) algo-
rithm of the scheme and sends the public parameters
PP to the adversary A .
Signcrypt Query Phase – the adversary A can
request, as many times as he wants, the following
queries:
• KeyGen – the adversary A queries, for each
session i, a signcryption attribute set AA ,i with
respect to a threshold ti where |AA ,i ∩ S∗| <
ti. The challenger C answers by running the
KeyGen(PP,msk,AA ,i) algorithm and sends the re-
sulting secret key to the adversary A . The secret
key is referred to as skA ,i.
• SignCrypt – the adversary A requests the sign-
cryption of a message M while considering for
each session i, a signcryption attribute set AC ,i
and a threshold ti. The challenger C exe-
cutes the KeyGen to generate the secret key
skC ,i = KeyGen(PP,msk,AC ,i) and then, he exe-
cutes SignCrypt algorithm and returns the sign-
crypted message Σi = SignCrypt(PP,skC ,i,
AC ,i,(ti,S∗),M) to the adversary A .
Forgery Phase – after the Signcrypt Query
Phase, the adversary A outputs a ciphertext Σ∗
with respect to the threshold challenge policy
(t∗,S∗) (i.e; t∗ has never been queried during
the Signcrypt Query Phase and where ti < t∗).
Then, the challenger unsigncrypts Σ∗ using the
secret key skC and obtains a message M∗. The
adversary A wins the game if Σ∗ is valid and was
not obtained from a SignCrypt query. That is,
UnsignCrypt(PP,skC ,AC ,(t∗,S∗),Σ∗) = M and A
did not issue a SignCrypt(PP,skC ,AC ,(t∗,S∗),M).
The adversary’s advantage is defined as
AdvA [Expun f (1ξ)] = |Pr[Expun f (1ξ)] = 1|.
Definition 2. A t-ABSC scheme is unforgeable
against chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA), if the
probability AdvA [Expun f (1ξ)] is negligible for all
PPT adversaries.
This unforgeability property also includes the col-
lusion among users trying to override their rights by
combining their complementary attributes to generate
a signcrypted message satisfying a given access pol-
icy (t,S).
4.2.3 Privacy
A threshold attribute-based signcryption scheme is
said to be computationally private if any adevrsary A
running in polynomial time can not win the ExpA
Priv
security game with non-negligible advantage. The
ExpA
Priv security game is formally defined, between
an adversary A and a challenger C as follows:
Setup – the adversary A chooses an attributes uni-
verse U where |U|= n and sends it to the challenger
C . Then, the challenger runs the setup algorithm and
returns the public parameters to the adversary A .
Challenge Phase – the adversary A chooses
an access policy (t,S) such that 1 ≤ t ≤ |S| ≤ n,
two attribute sets AS1 and AS2 satisfying the thresh-
old access policy such that |AS1 ∩ S| = |AS2 ∩ S| =
t, and a message M and sends them to the chal-
lenger C . Afterwards, C picks a random bit b ∈
{0,1} and executes the KeyGen algorithm such that
skC = KeyGen(PP,msk,C ,ASb) and then, outputs the
signcryption Σb = SignCrypt(PP,skC ,ASb ,(t,S),M).
The signcrypted message Σb is sent to the adversary
A as a challenge message.
Guess – the adversary outputs a bit b′ and wins
the game if b′ = b.
The advantage of the adversary A in the above game
is defined as AdvA [ExpPriv(1ξ)] = |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |.
Definition 3. A threshold attribute-based sign-
cryption scheme is computationally private if
AdvA [ExpPriv(1ξ)] is negligible with respect to the
security parameter λ, for any adversary A running in
a polynomial time.
5 A NOVEL CONSTANT-SIZE
THRESHOLD ATTRIBUTE
BASED SIGNCRYPTION FOR
CLOUD APPLICATIONS
5.1 Overview
In this paper, we develop a new constant size thresh-
old Attribute Based Signcryption Scheme (t-ABSC)
as a novel security mechanism for the access control,
data encryption, and message authentication in cloud
storage environments. Our proposal is based on the
use of the constant-size threshold identity based en-
cryption scheme proposed by Delerablee et al. (Deler-
able´e and Pointcheval, 2008) in 2008 and the constant
size attribute based encryption proposed by Harranz
et al. (Herranz et al., 2010) in 2010, which have been
extended to provide all security features as presented
in section 2. For instance, our scheme introduces
a novel attribute based signature which is combined
with the encryption scheme to design a signcryption
scheme. Thus, beyond including the attribute based
ciphertext, the signcrypted message involves the gen-
erated signatures. Moreover, our system supports the
common setup procedures (i.e; public parameters and
users’ keys are same for both encryption and signature
processes). In addition, it supports anonymous data-
origin authentication and provides flexible control to
data.
5.2 Complexity Assumptions
In, our constant size threshold attribute based sign-
cryption construction, we rely on the Computational
Diffie Hellman Assumption (CDH) and the aug-
mented multi-sequence of exponents computational
Diffie-Hellman ((l˜, m˜, t˜)-aMSE-CDH), which was in-
troduced by Delerable´e et al. (Delerable´e et al., 2007;
Delerable´e and Pointcheval, 2008) in 2007. These as-
sumptions are defined as follows:
Definition 4. Computational Diffie Hellman As-
sumption (CDH) – Let G be a group of a prime or-
der p, and g is a generator of G. The CDH prob-
lem is, given the tuple of elements (g,ga,gb), where
{a,b} R←− Zp, there is no efficient probabilistic algo-
rithm ACDH that computes gab.
Definition 5. (l˜, m˜, t˜)-augmented multi-sequence of
exponents computational Diffie-Hellman ((l˜, m˜, t˜)-
aMSE-CDH) – The (l˜, m˜, t˜)-aMSE-CDH problem re-
lated to the group pair (G,GT) is to compute T =
e(g0,h0)k· f (γ). It takes as input: the vector ~xl˜+m˜ =
(x1, · · · ,xl˜+m˜)> whose components are pairwise dis-
tinct elements of Zp which define the polynomials f(X)
and g(X) as follows:
f (X) =
l˜
∏
i=1
(X + xi); g(X) =
l˜+m˜
∏˜
l+1
(X + xi) (1)
where the values xi are random and pairwise distinct
of Z∗p, and the values:
g0,g
γ
0, · · · ,gγ
l˜+t˜−2
0 ,g
k·γ· f (γ)
0
gωγ0 , · · · ,gωγ
l˜+t˜−2
0
gα0 ,g
αγ
0 , · · · ,gαγ
l˜+t˜
0
h0,h
γ
0, · · · ,hγ
m˜−2
0
hω0 ,h
ωγ
0 , · · · ,hωγ
m˜−1
0
hα0 ,h
αγ
0 , · · · ,hαγ
2(m˜−t˜)+3
0
Where k,α,γ,ω are unknown random elements of
Zp and g0 and h0 are generators of G. We can solve
the problem if we get an output b∈ {0,1} where b= 1
if T = e(g0,h0)k· f (γ) or b = 0 when T is a random
value from GT .
5.3 Aggregate Algorithm
Our scheme construction relies on the aggregate algo-
rithm Aggreg introduced by Delerablee et al. (Deler-
able´e et al., 2007; Delerable´e and Pointcheval, 2008).
This algorithm is explained in the following descrip-
tion:
Let us consider a list of values {g rγ+xi ,xi}1≤i≤n,
where r,γ ∈ Z∗p and x1, · · · ,xn are pairwise different.
Then , the algorithm proceeds as follows:
Aggreg({g rγ+xi ,xi}1≤i≤n) = g
r
∏ni=1(γ+xi)
Concretely, the Aggreg algorithm defines P0,m =
g
r
γ+xm for each m ∈ {1, · · · ,n}. Afterwards, the al-
gorithm computes sequentially Pi,m for i = 1 · · ·n− 1
and m = i+1, · · · ,n using the induction:
Pi,m = (
Pi−1,i
Pi−1,m
)
1
xm−xi (2)
Then, we get Pi,m = g
r
(γ+xm)∏ik=1(γ+xk) where 1 ≤ i ≤
m≤ n.
Therefore, since the elements x1, · · · ,xn are pair-
wise different (Herranz et al., 2010; Attrapadung
et al., 2012) and using the equation 2, we can com-
pute Pi,m for i = 1 · · ·n−1 and m = i+1 · · ·n such as
Pn,n−1 = g
r
∏ni=1(γ+xi)
5.4 Concrete Construction
Our construction is based on the four algorithms de-
fined as follows:
• Setup – the trusted authority defines a bilinear
group triple (G1,G2,G) of prime order p, a bi-
linear map eˆ : G1×G2 → G and a collusion re-
sistant hash function H : {0,1}∗ → Zp. In ad-
dition, It specifies an encoding function τ such
that τ : U → (Z/pZ)∗, where |U| = n and U is
an attribute universe supported by the trusted au-
thority. For each attribute a ∈ U, the encoded
attribute values τ(a) = x are pairwise different.
Then, the Setup algorithm selects two generators
g and h ofG1 andG2, respectively. It also chooses
a set of pairwise different elements of (Z/pZ)∗,
Di = {d1, · · · ,di} where i≤ n−1. Finally, it out-
puts the global public parameters PP defined as
follows:
PP = {G1,G2,G, eˆ,{hαγi}{i=0,··· ,2n−1},Di,τ,u =
gα·γ,e(gα,h),H }
We note that the master key of the trusted author-
ity is referred to as msk = (g,α,γ) where α,γ are
two random from values (Z/pZ)∗.
• KeyGen – for any subset Ai ⊂U of attributes as-
sociated with a user Ei, the algorithm chooses a
random value rEi ∈ (Z/pZ)∗ and computes the re-
lated secret key as follows:
skEi = ({g
rEi
γ+τ(a) }a∈Ai ,{hrEi γ
i}i=0,··· ,m−2,h
rEi
−1
γ )
= (skEi1 ,skEi2 ,skEi3 )
• SignCrypt – let (t,S) be the access policy where
S ⊂U is an attribute set of size s = |S| such that
1≤ t ≤ |S| and let AS be the sub-set of attribute set
related to the signcrypting entity ES where |AS ∩
S|= t.
To signcrypt the message M with respect to (t,S),
ES uses his secret key and the aggregate algorithm
Aggreg introduced in the Section 5.3 and com-
putes T1 such as:
T1 = Aggreg({g
rES
γ+τ(a) ,τ(a)}a∈AS) = g
rES
∏a∈AS (γ+τ(a))
Then, ES defines the polynomial P(AS,S)(γ) such
as:
P(AS,S)(γ) =
1
γ
( ∏
a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS
(γ+ τ(a))−B1)
Where B1 =∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS τ(a)
Afterwards, using the element skEi2 , the sign-
crypting entity derives B2 as follows:
B2 = h
rES P(AS ,S)(γ)/B1
In the sequel, ES computes H (M) and gener-
ates the signature σ = (σ1,σ2,σ3) defined as:
σ1 = T1 ·g
H (M)
∏a∈AS (γ+τ(a))
σ2 = skES3 ·B2 ·h
H (M)P(AS ,S)(γ)/B1
σ3 = hα·H (M)
Finally, ES picks a random κ ∈ (Z/pZ)∗ and
computes C1, C2 and C3. Note that the elements
C1, C2 are computed using the public parameters
u and eˆ(g,h)α. Moreover, the set {hαγi}i=0,··· ,2n−1
is used to compute C3 with respect to the equation
1. C1, C2 and C3 are detailed as follows:
C1 = (gα·γ)−κ
C2 = h
κα·∏a∈S(γ+τ(a))∏d∈Dn+t−1−s (γ+d)
C3 = eˆ(g,h)α·κ · eˆ(g,h)α·H (M) ·M = K ·M
Finally, the signcrypting entity out-
puts the signcryption of the message M,
Σ= (C1,C2,C3,σ1,σ2,σ3,P(AS,S)(γ),B1).
• UnsignCrypt – any user EU having a set of at-
tributes AU where |AU ∩S|= t can verify and de-
crypt the signcrypted message under the access
policy (t,S).
First, to verify that the received message has been
correctly signed by ES, EU has to check the fol-
lowing equality:
s = eˆ(u−1,σ2) · eˆ(σ
1
B1
1 ,h
α·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s (γ+τ(a)))
·eˆ(gα,h)H (M) = eˆ(gα,h)
where U1 =∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS
γ+τ(a)
τ(a) .
Then, for all a ∈ AU , EU has to aggregate the re-
quired attributes such as:
A2 = Aggreg({g
rEU
γ+τ(a) ,τ(a)}a∈AU )= g
rEU
∏a∈AU (γ+τ(a))
(3)
Afterwards, EU uses the aggregated secret key A2
and the skEU2 key element to compute:
[eˆ(C1,h
rEU P(AS ,S)(γ)) · eˆ(A2,C2)]
1
B1 = e(g,h)(κ·α)·rEU
Then, the unsigncrypting entity EU deduces the
deciphering key K such as:
K =
eˆ(C1,skEU2 ) · eˆ(g,σ3)
eˆ(g,h)κ·rEU ·α
= eˆ(g,h)α·(H (M)+κ)
= eˆ(g,h)α·κ · eˆ(g,h)α·H (M)
Finally, EU recovers the message by computing
M = C3K .
Then, to verify the authenticity of the signature
of the signcrypting entity, the user EU uses the
retrieved message M to compute H (M). After-
wards, EU verifies that σ3 = hα·H (M)
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove the correctness and the
security of our construction with respect to the secu-
rity model as defined in section 4.2.
6.1 Correctness
Any user EU having a set of attributes AU where
|AU ∩ S| = t can verify and decrypt the signcrypted
message under the policy (t,S).
In the following, we denote by s, the
quantity eˆ(u−1,σ2) · eˆ(gα,h)H (M)·(1−U1−
1
U1
) ·
eˆ(σ
1
B1
1 ,h
α·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s (γ+τ(a))), where U1 =
∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS
γ+τ(a)
τ(a) .
First, EU has to verify that ES has correctly signed
the message M, such as:
s = eˆ(g−α·γ,h
rES
−1
γ ·h
(rES
+H (M))·P(AS ,S)(γ)
∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS (τ(a)+γ) )
·eˆ(gα,h)H (M)·(1−U1− 1U1 ) ·
eˆ(g
(rES
+H (M))
∏a∈AS (γ+τ(a))·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS τ(a) ,
hα·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s (τ(a)+γ))
= eˆ(g−α·γ,h
rES
−1
γ h
rES ·
P(AS ,S)
(γ)
∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS (τ(a)+γ) )
·eˆ(g−α·γ,h
H (M)·
P(AS ,S)
(γ)
∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS τ(a) )
·eˆ(gα,h)H (M) · eˆ(gα,h)−H (M)·U1 · eˆ(gα,h)
−H (M)
U1
·eˆ(g
rES
∏a∈AS (γ+τ(a))·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS τ(a) ,
hα·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s (τ(a)+γ)) ·
eˆ(g
H (M)
∏a∈AS (γ+τ(a))·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS τ(a) ,
hα·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s (τ(a)+γ))
= eˆ(gα,h)H (M) · eˆ(gα,h)−H (M)·U1 · eˆ(gα,h)
−H (M)
U1
eˆ(gα,h) · eˆ(gα,h)H (M)·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS
γ+τ(a)
τ(a)
·eˆ(gα,h)−H (M)·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS
τ(a)
τ(a)
·eˆ(gα,h)
H (M)·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s (γ+τ(a))
∏a∈AS (γ+τ(a))·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AS τ(a)
= eˆ(gα,h)
In the sequel, EU aggregates his secret keys to ob-
tain A2, as defined in Equation 3, uses the skEU2 key
element and computes:
eˆ(C1,h
rEU P(AU ,S)(γ)) · eˆ(A2,C2) (4)
= e(g,h)κ·α·rEU ∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AU τ(a)
and
eˆ(C1,h
rEU
−1
γ ) = eˆ(g,h)−κ·rEU ·α · eˆ(g,h)κ·α (5)
Afterwards, to derive the deciphering key K, the
user EU executes Equations 6, 7 and 8 defined as fol-
lows:
eˆ(g,h)κ·rEU ·α = (eˆ(C1,hrEU P(AU ,S)(γ)))· (6)
eˆ(A2,C2))
1
∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\AU τ(a)
eˆ(g,h)κ·α = eˆ(C1,h
rEU
−1
γ )eˆ(g,h)κ·rEU ·α (7)
eˆ(g,σ3) = eˆ(g,hα·H (M)) = eˆ(g,h)α·H (M) (8)
Finally, the user can retrieve the message:
M =
C3
eˆ(g,h)α·(H (M)+κ)
=
C3
K
(9)
Then, he computes H (M), using the retrieved mes-
sage M, in order to verify that the received σ3 is equal
to hα·H (M).
6.2 Confidentiality
For the security game against the confidentiality prop-
erty introduced in Section 4.2.1, the adversary A
tries to distinguish between two signcrypted messages
generated using the signcryption scheme. In other
words, the adversary A tries to solve the aMSE −
CDH problem using a challenging algorithm B .
In a first phase, the adversary A sets a set of
signcryption attributes S∗. Then, the algorithm
B generates and publishes the public parameters.
In the second phase, the adversary A tries to
gain knowledge about the unsigncryption process
by requesting the execution of the KeyGen and
UnsignCrypt algorithms. Thanks to the hardness
of the aMSE − CDH problem, the adversary A
cannot recognize the secret values such as ri,γ used
to generate the users’ secret keys. The Challenge
Phase consists of choosing two messages by the
adversary and sending them to the algorithm B .
Then, B randomly chooses a message, signcrypts
it and returns it to the adversary. A tries to guess
the original message being signcrypted. However,
with respect to the hardness of the aMSE −CDH
problem (Definition 5), the adversary is not able to
guess the message even if he might after seeing the
challenge ciphertext. Note that the adversary may
not request decryption of the challenge message itself.
In the following detailed proof, we prove that
our scheme is IND-CCA2 secure assuming that the
aMSE −CDH problem is hard to solve with respect
to Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let ξ be an integer. For any adversary A
against the IND-CCA2 security of our attribute-based
signcryption scheme, for a universe of m attributes
U, and a challenge pair (t∗,S∗) with s = |S∗|, there
exists a solver B of the (l˜, m˜, t˜)-aMSE-CDH problem,
for l˜ = m− s, m˜ = m+ t− s and t˜ = t + 1, such that
Pr[ExpB
aMSE−CDH(1ξ)]≥ 12 Pr[ExpA con f (1ξ)].
Proof. We consider an algorithm B that uses the ad-
versary A as a black-box and that solves the (l˜, m˜, t˜)-
aMSE-CDH problem.
Let I ( ~x2m+t−1−s,κ,µ,α,γ,ω,T ) be the input of
the algorithm B where the components of the vec-
tor ~x2m+t−1−s = (x1, · · · ,x2m+t−1−s) are pairwise dis-
tinct elements of (Z/pZ)∗ and let define the polyno-
mials f (X) and g(X) as detailed in Definition 5. First,
B chooses a universe of attributes U = {a1, · · · ,am}.
Then, the adversary A defines a set S∗ ⊂ U where
|S| = s and a threshold t∗ such that 1 ≤ t∗ ≤ s. We
assume that S∗ = {am−s+1, · · · ,am} ⊂U. We denote
by AA the subset A∩S∗, for any subset of attributes A.
Setup – the algorithm B sets τ(ai) = xi for i =
1, · · · ,m as the encoding function of the attributes.
Notice that the encoding of the first m− s elements
are the opposite of the roots of f (X), and the en-
coding of the attributes in S∗ are the opposite of
some roots of g(X) (Delerable´e and Pointcheval,
2008). Then, B defines the values corresponding to
the dummy attributes D = {d1, · · · ,dm−1} as d j =
xm+ j if j = 1, · · · ,m+ t − 1− s. For j = m+ t −
s, · · · ,m− 1, where the d j values are selected at ran-
dom in (Z/pZ)∗ so that the elements of the sub-
set {x1, · · · ,x2m+t−1−s,dm+t−s, · · · ,d j−1} are pairwise
distinct. The algorithm B defines g = g0 f (γ) which
can be computed using f . To complete the Setup
phase, the algorithm B sets h = h0 and computes:
• u = gα·γ = g0α·γ· f (γ) can be computed since
X f (X) is a polynomial of degree l˜ + 1. In fact,
the quantity αγ f (γ) is a linear combination of
αγ, · · · ,αγl˜+1 where its coefficients are known to
B .
• v = eˆ(g,h)α = eˆ(g0α· f (γ),h0), where gα is com-
puted based on Equation 5.
The algorithm B derives the values {hαγi}i=0,··· ,2m−1
from the input set I . Finally, the algorithm B returns
the public parameters to the adversary A .
Unsigncryption Query Phase 1 – during this
phase, B and A proceed as follows:
• KeyGen – for each KeyGen query i, A requests
the key extraction for a subset AA from B ,
where |AA | < ti. To compute the queried secret
keys, B chooses ri = (ωyiγ + 1)Qi(γ), where
yi is randomly picked in (Z/pZ)∗, and B de-
fines the polynomial Qi(X) as Qi(γ) = 1 when
|AA |= 0, or Qi(X) = λi ·∏a∈AA (X + τ(a)) where
λi = (∏a∈AA τ(a))
−1.
Then, the algorithm B can compute
the components of the secret key tuple
skA = ({g
ri
γ+τ(a) }a∈AA ,{hriγ
k}k=0,··· ,m−2,h
ri−1
γ )
for a set of attributes AA = {ai1 , · · · ,ain} ⊂ U,
queried at session i, as follows:
– for each ak ∈ AA , the algorithm B com-
putes Qak(γ) =
Qi(γ)
(γ+τ(ak))
= λi ·∏a˜k∈AA ,a˜k 6=ak(γ+
τ(a˜k)). Then, B calculates the first secret
key element skA1 = {g
ri
γ+τ(ak) }ak∈AA defined as
skA1 = {g0 f (γ)ωyiQak (γ) ·g0 f (γ)Qak (γ)}ak∈AA .
– for each ak ∈ A \ AA , the algorithm B de-
fines fak(X) =
f (X)
(X+τ(ak))
. Then, B computes
the first secret key element such as skA1 =
{g
ri
γ+τ(ak) }ak∈AA
= {g0 fak (γ)ωyiQi(γ) ·g0 fak (γ)Qi(γ)}ak∈AA .
– B calculates the second item of the secret
key skA2 = {hriγ
j} j=0,··· ,m−2 such as hriγ j =
hωyiγ
j+1Qi(γ) ·hγ jQi(γ).
– finally, B computes the third secret key element
such as skA3 = h
ri−1
γ = hωyiQi(γ) ·h
Qi(γ)−1
γ .
• UnsignCrypt – the adversary A can adaptively
requests the unsigncryption queries while con-
sidering the signcryption attribute set AU . The
algorithm B executes the KeyGen to generate
the secret key skB = KeyGen(PP,msk,AU )
and finally, B answers by running the
Unsigncrypt(PP,skB ,AU ,(ti,S∗),Σi) algo-
rithm and forwards Mi to the adversary.
Challenge Phase – the adversary A chooses the
two equal length plaintext messages M0∗ and M1∗ and
sends them to B , who flips a coin b ∈ {0,1}. Then,
B sets C∗3 = T ·Mb. Afterwards, B chooses a random
value for the encryption as κ′ = κ/α and computes
H (Mb). Then, B sets C∗2 = h
κ′·g(γ)
0 , C
∗
1 = (g
κ′·γ· f (γ)
0 )
−1
and σ∗3 = h0
H (Mb).
Unsigncryption Query Phase 2 – the queries are
executed as in the Unsigncryption Query Phase 1.
Guess – the adversary A outputs a bit b′. If b′ = b,
B answers 1 as the solution to the given instance of
the aMSE-CDH problem with respect to Definition
5, meaning that T = eˆ(g0,h0)(κ+H (Mb)) · f (γ). Other-
wise, B answers 0, meaning that T is a random ele-
ment. The advantage of the algorithm B is as follows:
Pr[ExpaMSE−CDHB (1
ξ)] = |Pr[B(I( ~x2m+t−1−s,κ,µ,
α,γ,ω,T ) = 1|real]
−Pr[B(I( ~x2m+t−1−s,κ,µ,
α,γ,ω,T ) = 1|random]|
= |Pr[b = b′|real]
−Pr[b = b′|random]|
When the event real occurs, then A is playing
a real attack and therefore |Pr[b = b′|real]− 12 ]| =
1
2 ExpA
con f (1ξ). During the random event, the view
of A is completely independent of the bit b; in this
case, the probability Pr[b = b′] is equal to 1/2. Then,
we obtain:
Pr[ExpB
aMSE−CDH(1ξ)]≥ 1
2
Pr[ExpA
con f (1ξ)]
Thus, for all PPT adversaries, the advantage of
the adversary A is negligeable. Then, our proposed
t − ABSC scheme satisfies the confidentiality prop-
erty.
6.3 Unforgeability
In the security game defined in Section 4.2.2, the ad-
versary A tries to forge a valid signature based on
the use of an algorithm B who is able to solve the
aMSE−CDH problem.
Thus, the adversary A chooses a set of signcryp-
tion attributes S∗ and a threshold t, in the Setup phase.
Afterwards, the adversary A requests the execution of
the KeyGen queries while changing the threshold ti.
Moreover, the adversary A asks for the signcryption
of a message M under different signcryption attribute
sets and threshold values. By executing this Sign-
crypt Query Phase, the adversary tries to get infor-
mation about the secret values included in the KeyGen
and SignCrypt algorithms.
Afterwards, the adversary A tries to generate a
valid signcryption with respect to the challenge pol-
icy (t∗,S∗). Thus, the adversary A has to solve the
aMSE−CDH problem with respect to the Definition
5 for proving that he has the required attributes to sat-
isfy the (t∗,S∗) access policy. Moreover, thanks to the
random values added to the generated signature, the
adversary A has to solve the CDH problem with re-
spect to the Definition 4.
However, thanks to the hardness of to the aMSE−
CDH problem and the CDH problem, the adversary
cannot learn information about the secret values used
in the key generation and the signcryption process.
In the following, we prove that our construction
is unforgeable against chosen message attack with re-
spect to Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. The scheme is adaptive-message un-
forgeable under chosen message attacks for a uni-
verse U of m attributes, and a challenge pair (t∗,S∗)
with s = |S∗|, there exists a solver B of the ((l˜, m˜, t˜)-
aMSE-CDH problem, for l˜ = m− s, m˜ = m+ t − s
and t˜ = t + 1, such that Pr[ExpB
aMSE−CDH(1ξ)] ≥
Pr[ExpA
un f (1ξ) = 1] assuming that the (l˜, m˜, t˜)-
aMSE-CDH problem holds.
Proof. We consider an algorithm B that uses the ad-
versary A as a black-box and that solves the (l˜, m˜, t˜)-
aMSE-CDH problem.
Let I ( ~x2m+t−1−s,κ,µ,α,γ,ω,T ) be the input of
the algorithm B where the components of the vec-
tor ~x2m+t−1−s = (x1, · · · ,x2m+t−1−s) are pairwise dis-
tinct elements of (Z/pZ)∗ and define the polynomi-
als f (X) and g(X) as detailed in Definition 5. First,
B chooses a universe of attributes U = {a1, · · · ,am}.
Then, the adversary A chooses a set S∗ ⊂ U where
|S| = s and a threshold t∗ such that 1 ≤ t∗ ≤ s. We
assume that S∗ = {am−s+1, · · · ,am} ⊂U. We denote
by AA the subset A∩S∗, for any subset of attributes A.
We consider the same setting for the Setup phase
as detailed in the Expcon f security game. For the
Signcrypt Query Phase, the adversary A requests,
as many times as he wants, the key extraction oracle
KeyGen and the signcryption oracle SignCrypt. For
each KeyGen query i, A requests the key extraction
for a subset AA from B , as detailed in the Expcon f se-
curity game.
Afterwards, the adversary A can adap-
tively request a SignCrypt query i while
considering the signcryption attribute set AU
and a message Mi. The algorithm B exe-
cutes the KeyGen to generate the secret key
skB = KeyGen(PP,msk,AU ) and finally, B answers
by running the signCrypt(PP,skB ,AU ,(ti,S∗),Mi)
algorithm and forwards Σi to the adversary.
The algorithm B sets Qi(γ)/λi =∏a∈AU (γ+τ(a))
and computes:
• σ1,i = g0(ωyiγ+1) f (γ)λi ·g0 f (γ)
λiH (Mi)
Qi(γ) .
• σ2,i = hωyiQi(γ) · h
Qi(γ)−1
γ · h
(ωyiγ+1)Qi(γ)·P(AU ,S∗)(γ)
∏a∈S∗∪Dn+t−1−s\AU τ(a) ·
h
H (Mi)P(AU ,S∗)(γ)
∏a∈S∗∪Dn+t−1−s\AU τ(a) .
• σ3,i = hα·H (Mi).
• finally, B computes C1,i, C2,i and C3,i, as detailed
in the Expcon f security game.
Forgery Phase – during this phase, A outputs a
signcrypted message Σ∗ with respect to the thresh-
old challenge policy (t∗,S∗). For this purpose, A can
compute C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 and σ
∗
3, based on public parame-
ters and the selected random κ∗ and H (Mi). Finally,
A has to compute valid σ∗1 and σ∗2 to win the un-
forgeability security game. Hence, A has to solve the
aMSE-CDH problem with respect to Definition 5 for
proving that he has the required attributes to satisfy
the (t∗,S∗) access policy. Similarly, the adversary A
has to solve the CDH problem with respect to Defini-
tion 4. Thus, A has the same advantage as the Expcon f
security game.
Thus, for all PPT adversaries, the advantage of the
adversary A is negligible. Then, our proposed t −
ABSC is unforgeable against chosen-message attack.
6.4 Privacy
The privacy game begins when the challenger C exe-
cutes the Setup algorithm to generate the public pa-
rameters. Then, the challenger C sends the public pa-
rameters to the adversary A . Afterwards, the adver-
sary A chooses two attribute sets AS1 and AS1 satisfy-
ing the threshold access policy (t,S) and sends them
to the challenger C . The challenger generates the pri-
vate keys related to the sets of attribute AS1 and AS2 as
follows:
skEC1 = ({g
rEC
γ+τ(a) }a∈AS1 ,{h
rEC γ
i}i=0,··· ,m−2,h
rEC
−1
γ )
skEC2 = ({g
rEC
γ+τ(a) }a∈AS2 ,{h
rEC γ
i}i=0,··· ,m−2,h
rEC
−1
γ )
Moreover, the adversary A outputs a challenge
message M and asks the challenger C to generate the
signcryption of M using one of the private keys skEC1
or skEC2 . Thus, the challenger chooses a random bit
b∈{0,1}, and computes a signcryption Σb by running
the algorithm SignCrypt(PP,skECb ,skECb ,(t,S),M).
Since |ASb ∩S|= t, the challenger can generate a valid
signcrytpion on the message M. Thus, to prove that
the scheme is private, we just have to prove that the
signcrypted message created using skEC1 or skEC2 are
identical.
Using the private key related to skECb , the gen-
erated signcryption Σb = (C1,C2,C3,σ1,σ2,σ3) is
detailed as follows:
C1 = (gα·γ)−κ
C2 = h
κα·∏a∈S(γ+τ(a))∏d∈Dn+t−1−s (γ+d)
C3 = eˆ(g,h)α·κ · eˆ(g,h)α·H (M) ·M = K ·M
and
σ1 = g
rEC
∏a∈ASb
(γ+τ(a)) ·g
H (M)
∏a∈ASb
(γ+τ(a))
σ2 = h
rEC
−1
γ h
rEC
·P(ASb ,S)
(γ)
∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\ASb
τ(a) ·h
H (M)P(ASb ,S)
(γ)
∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s\ASb
τ(a)
σ3 = hα·H (M)
While receiving the signcrypted message, the ad-
versary A verifies the signature, by computing:
s = eˆ(u−1,σ2) · eˆ(σ
1
B1
1 ,h
α·∏a∈S∪Dn+t−1−s (γ+τ(a))) ·
eˆ(gα,h)H (M)·(1−U1−
1
U1
)
= eˆ(gα,h)
Since |ASb ∩ S| = |AS1 ∩ S| = |AS2 ∩ S| = t, we
can prove that the signature generated using the set
of attributes AS1 ( in other words, using the secret
key skEC1 ) is similar to the signature generated using
the set of attributes AS2 ( using the secret key skEC2 ).
Hence, the challenger A cannot know the set of at-
tributes used to generate the signature with respect to
the hardness of the CDH problem (Definition 4).
Thus, our proposed attribute based signcryption
scheme is computationally private.
7 PERFORMANCES ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the computation and
the storage complexities of our proposed signcryption
scheme. In our analysis, we are interested in the com-
putations performed to execute the SignCrypt and
the UnsignCrypt algorithms as well as the size of
the generated signcrypted message (signcryption size)
and the size of the secret keys as introduced in Table
2. In the following, we denote by E1 the exponen-
tiation cost in G1, ET the exponentiation cost in GT
and τP the computation cost of a pairing function eˆ.
Table 2 details the performance comparison of ABSC
schemes.
7.1 Storage Complexities
Our signcryption scheme consists of using a common
setup procedure to generate the public parameters and
the secret keys used to sign and encrypt the mes-
sage. Our proposal relies on the use of a single access
structure for both signature and encryption phases on
the signcryption procedure unlike other signcryption
schemes. Thus, the key size is equal to n+m where m
and n= |A| are the cardinals of the attributes’ universe
U and the set of the user’s attributes, respectively.
The proposal of Emura et al. (Emura et al., 2012)
consists of using two access structures. As such, it
uses two different secret keys’ sets related to the sig-
nature and the encryption procedures. The size of the
first part of the keys is equal to 2ns while the size of
the second part is equal to 2ne + 1 where ns and ne
are the sizes of the set of the signing attributes and the
size of the set of the encryption attributes of the user,
respectively. Similarly, Liu et al. (Liu et al., 2015)
use two access structures. So that, the sizes of the se-
cret keys are equal to ns + 2 and ne + 2 for signing
and encrypting, respectively. The proposal of Gagne´
et al. (Gagne et al., 2010) also uses different access
structures for signature and encryption and consists
of using secret keys which their sizes are equal to
2ns and 3ne. Finally, Rao et al.(Rao and Dutta, 2014)
proposal consists of a key-policy attribute based sign-
cryption scheme which relies on the use of different
Table 2: Computation and Storage Costs of Attribute Based Signcryption Schemes
Scheme Key size Signcryption size Signcrypt time Unsigncrypt time
(Emura et al., 2012) 2ns,2ne+1 2+5le+2ns E1(10+4ns)+ET + τp τp(3ns+2+2ne+2m)
(Liu et al., 2015) ns+2,ne+2 4+2ls+ le τp+ET +E1(3+ le+3ls) τp(3ns+5)+2nsET +2nsE1
(Gagne et al., 2010) 3ne,2ns O(M)+4+ne+ns E1(2O(M)+mne+4ne+3+ns) 2E1+ τp(2t+2+ns)+ tET+
(Rao and Dutta, 2014) m+ ls,m+ le 8 E1(10+ le+3ls+ns) 6τp+E1(ne+3le)
(Rao and Dutta, 2016) m+ ls,m+ le 8 E1(10+ le+3ls+ns) 6τp+E1(ne+3le)
Our scheme n+m 8 E1(6+ t)+2ET E1(5+ t)+9τp+4ET
access structures for signing and encrypting. Thus,
the sizes of the secret keys are equal to m+ ls and
m+ le where ls and le denote the sizes of the signing
policy and the encryption policy, respectively.
Emura et al. (Emura et al., 2012) propose a CP-ABSC
scheme where the size of the signcrypted message is
equal to 2+5le+2ns. Thus, it increases linearly with
both the number of attributes introduced in the en-
cryption access policy le and the number of the sign-
ing attributes of the user ns. Moreover, the proposal
of Liu et al. (Liu et al., 2015) introduces a signcryp-
tion scheme where the size of the signcrypted mes-
sage depends on the number of attributes used on both
encryption and signature policies (ls, le). For instance,
this scheme outputs a signrypted message whose size
is 4+2ls+ le. The threshold attribute based signcryp-
tion scheme proposed by Gagne´ et al. outputs a sign-
crypted message’s size depending on both the number
of the user’s attributes related to signing and decrypt-
ing, ns and ne, respectively. The size of the signrypted
message is equal to O(M) + 4+ ne + ns. The pro-
posal of Rao et al.(Rao and Dutta, 2014) is the first
constant size key-policy attribute based signcryption
scheme. Indeed, the size of the signcrypted message
is equal to 8 and it is independent from the number
of attributes involved in the access policy. Similarly,
our t-ABSC proposal is the first threshold ciphertext-
policy attribute based signcryption scheme that out-
puts a constant signcrypted message’s size equal to 8,
where the size of the signcrypted message does not
depend on the size of the access policy.
Consequently, our proposal is the only threshold
ciphertext-policy attribute based signcryption that
uses a common setup based on a single access
policy for encryption and signing. Although, our
scheme presents less expressiveness compared to
other schemes, it presents interesting performances
especially related to the key size and the constant size
of the encrypted message.
7.2 Computation Complexities
In (Emura et al., 2012), Emura et al. proposal con-
sists of computing (10+ 4ns) exponentiations in G1,
one exponentiation in GT and one pairing function
while performing the signcryption algorithm. More-
over, the unsigncryption algorithm computes (3ns +
2+ 2ne + 2m) pairing function. Recently, Liu et al.
(Liu et al., 2015) executes (3+ le + 3ls) exponentia-
tions in G1, one exponentiation in GT and one pair-
ing function during the signcryption procedure. Both
the proposed schemes by Rao et al. (Rao and Dutta,
2014; Rao and Dutta, 2016) introduce an attribute
based signcryption scheme where the signcryption
and unsigncryption processing overheads are equal
to E1(10+ le + 3ls + ns) and 6τp +E1(ne + 3le), re-
spectively. The threshold attribute based signcryp-
tion scheme proposed by Gagne´ et al. introduces a
signcryption mechanism where the signcrypting con-
ists of performing (2O(M)+mne +4ne +3+ns) ex-
ponentiation in G1, where O(M) is the size of the
plaitext message. Moreover, the unsigncryption al-
gorithm consists of (2t + 2+ ns) pairing function, 2
exponentiations in G1 and t exponentiations in GT .
Finally, our proposed t-ABSC scheme consists of per-
forming (6+ t) exponentiations inG1 and 2 exponen-
tiations in GT in the signcryption phase. In addition,
it computes (5+ t) exponentiations inG1, 2 exponen-
tiations in GT and 9 pairing function to perform the
unsigncryption algorithm. It is noteworthy that the
computation overheads of the signcryption and un-
signcryption procedures introduced in our threshold
attribute based signcryption scheme only depends on
the threshold value t.
Our proposed scheme presents interesting computa-
tion costs compared to other signcryption schemes
thanks to the use of common setup phase to gener-
ate public parameters and the use of the same access
policy for both signature and encryption phases. For
instance, our proposal consists of performing a fixed
number of pairing functions whose computation over-
head are heavy compared to the exponentiation oper-
ations.
8 CONCLUSIONS
The widespread use of cloud data storage and
the attractive properties offered by the attribute based
mechanisms lead us to combine them in order to en-
sure data security and user’s privacy. In this paper, we
have proposed a novel threshold attribute based sign-
cryption (t-ABSC) scheme ensuring flexible access
control, data confidentiality, user’s privacy as well as
data origin authentication with anonymity. Moreover,
the size of signcrypted messages does not depend on
the number of attributes involved in the access pol-
icy, which makes our t-ABSC scheme more suitable
for bandwidth-limited applications. Finally, our con-
struction is proven to ensure strong security properties
in the random oracle model, namely confidentiality
against the chosen ciphertext attacks, unforgeability
against chosen message attacks and privacy preserva-
tion, based on formal security games.
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